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We elicit social preferences of 883 children and teenagers, aged eight to 17 years, in an
experiment. Using an econometric mixture model we estimate a subject’s primary and
secondary social preference motivations. The secondary motivation indicates the motiva-
tion that becomes relevant when the primary motivation implies indifference between
various choices. For girls, particularly older ones, maximin-preferences are the most fre-
quent primary motivation, while for boys efﬁciency concerns are most relevant. Examining
secondary motivations reveals that girls are mostly social-welfare-oriented, with strong
equity concerns. Boys are also oriented towards social welfare, but are more concerned
with efﬁciency than with equity.Experiment
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i. Introduction
Social preferences, sometimes referred to as other-regarding preferences, are important in many areas of decision mak-
ng. They matter in charitable giving (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; List, 2011), bilateral or small-group bargaining (Kugler
t al., 2007), social choice (Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), the private provision of public goods (Fischbacher and Gächter,
010), or in exchange situations without contractual enforcement (Fehr et al., 1993; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). As a
onsequence, they shape the design of behaviorally optimal institutions and contracts (Fehr et al., 2007). Numerous models
ave been developed in economics that all capture important forms of social preferences (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998;
ehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk
nd Fischbacher, 2006; Kerschbamer, 2015). Given the ubiquitous importance of social preferences, research in economics
n the origins and the development of social preferences over the life-cycle has gained ground in recent years, as Section 2
ill show.
In this paper, we present an experiment with 883 children and adolescents, aged eight to 17 years. Using eight simple,
ne-shot allocation tasks (taken from Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), we study the distribution of effective social prefer-
nces across age and gender. According to the choices made in the incentivized allocation decisions, we can classify our
xperimental subjects according to ﬁve different motivations in terms of social preferences that have captured large inter-
st in the literature1: selﬁshness, efﬁciency (maximizing the sum of payoffs in a reference group), maximin (maximizing
he minimum payoff in a reference group), and two forms of inequality aversion (minimizing the difference in payoffs in a
eference group). The classiﬁcation is done by conducting a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of subjects’ decisions
following, in general, the econometric model used in Costa-Gomes et al., 2001). The mixture model used here assumes that
ach subject’s motivation is drawn from a common prior distribution over the ﬁve types of motivations and that a subject’s
rimary motivation is the same for all eight decisions, but that decision makers are allowed to make errors. One innovation
f the paper, compared to related papers, is our ability to estimate also the secondary motivation of a particular subject. This
econdary motivation becomes crucial for decisions when the primary motivation implies indifference between various
vailable choices. By estimating both a primary and a secondary motivation, we believe that we are able to address the
nterplay between different motivations in a more detailed way than has been done so far.
The results from our experiment show that the distribution of primary motivations is strongly inﬂuenced by age and
ender. For older boys (aged ten to 17), efﬁciency concerns become signiﬁcantly more relevant, while inequality aversion
oses importance. In contrast, older girls care much more about the minimum payoff in their reference groups (maximin-
otivation). Comparing boys and girls, we ﬁnd that efﬁciency concerns are signiﬁcantly more important for boys than for
irls from the age of ten years onwards, while a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of girls are maximin-motivated in all age
roups considered in our experiment. Girls are also signiﬁcantly more inequality averse than boys when they are twelve
ears or older. Of course, our estimations reveal considerable heterogeneity of motivations in all age groups. It is interesting
o note that, on average, the results for our oldest group of participants match the data of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) for
dults reasonably well.
Also examining secondary motivations enables us to get a broader picture of social preferences and gender differences.
ost girls’ primary motivation is maximin, but for those who hold another primary motivation, the modal secondary moti-
ations are maximin choices. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the importance of this social preference for girls. Moreover, many boys
re primarily efﬁciency-motivated, and for those who had another primary motivation, efﬁciency is the most common sec-
ndary motivation, conﬁrming that boys indeed care most for efﬁciency. In sum, our estimation of secondary motivations
orroborates our ﬁnding that girls and boys differ strongly in their social preferences, including both primary and secondary
otivations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we refer to related literature and put our contribution into
erspective. Section 3 discusses some theoretical background and explains our experimental design. In Section 4 we present
he experimental results, ﬁrst on an aggregate level and then on the basis of a mixture model that allows estimating the
istribution of motivations with regard to social preferences across age groups and gender. Section 5 discusses our ﬁndings
nd concludes the paper.
. Related literature and our contribution
The development of social preferences early on in life has captured growing interest in economics and other disciplines
n recent years. Studying potential changes of social preferences when children and teenagers grow up is interesting from
developmental perspective as it reveals insights on whether humans go through different phases in the development of
heir social behavior or whether social preferences can be considered as rather stable from early on in life (see, e.g., Fehr
t al., 2008; Gummerum et al., 2010). Moreover, studying the development and evolution of social preferences in children
nd teenagers may be helpful for ultimately identifying their sources such as social norms, family backgrounds, or cultural
nﬂuences (Deckers et al., 2015).
1 Note that we are focusing here on outcome-based social preferences. Hence, we will disregard other aspects, like reciprocity, guilt, or intentions.
Fehr et al. (2008) present a study with 229 children aged three to eight years, in which children have to allocate rewards
between themselves and one other child. They show that egalitarianism, i.e., inequality aversion develops strongly in the
period of life that they capture. Children at the age of three and four behave selﬁshly to a very large degree, whereas the
majority of children aged seven or eight prefer egalitarian allocations that avoid both advantageous and disadvantageous
inequality. More precisely, about 60% of seven- to eight-year old children can be classiﬁed as having egalitarian preferences,
while the corresponding share for three- to four-year olds is only 20%. Fehr et al. (2013) extend the study of Fehr et al. (2008)
by letting 717 nine- to 17-year old children and adolescents make two-person allocation choices. Their major ﬁndings
are that spite and inequality aversion become less important with increasing age, while efﬁciency seeking becomes more
prevalent with increasing age.
Gummerum et al. (2010) ﬁnd in a dictator game with 77 children aged three to ﬁve years that older children share more
than younger children, and they show that girls are more generous than boys. Benenson et al. (2007) use a dictator game
with 360 children aged four to nine years and ﬁnd that older children and those from families with a higher socio-economic
status behave more altruistically, i.e., prefer more egalitarian choices over more selﬁsh ones. They ﬁnd no gender difference
in altruistic behavior. Eckel et al. (2011) conduct a dictator game experiment with 490 high school students from ninth
and eleventh grades (15–17 years old), and 91 university students. They ﬁnd very high levels of giving for their high school
students, but do not observe any differences between genders.
Harbaugh et al. (2003) report an experiment with 310 children and teenagers aged seven to 18 years, showing that young
children offer considerably less to recipients in the dictator game and the ultimatum game than older children and adults.
Hence, the degree of selﬁshness, on average, decreases with age. Harbaugh et al. (2003) also show that boys make smaller
dictator offers than girls, meaning that boys are, on average, more selﬁsh.
Almås et al. (2010) run experiments with 486 children from ten to 18 years. They let them play modiﬁed dictator games
and ﬁnd that children’s fairness norms evolve from favoring equality to favoring equity when they grow older. They observe
signiﬁcantly stronger efﬁciency concerns in adolescents than in younger children and ﬁnd that male adolescents are more
strongly oriented towards efﬁciency than female adolescents.
Finally, Martinsson et al. (2011) use dictator games taken from Charness and Rabin (2002) and compare the behavior
of 650 Austrian and Swedish children, aged ten to 15 years. They ﬁnd a general trend towards an increasing importance of
social-welfare preferences with age, with only small differences across countries.
In sum, the clear majority of the mentioned studies suggest that in the course of growing up children become less selﬁsh
and more pro-social in allocation choices. While this general pattern mirrors ﬁndings in related psychological studies (see
Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989; Gummerum et al., 2010), social preferences have a richer domain than just being more or less
selﬁsh, respectivelymore or less generous, in two-person allocation tasks. For this reason,we estimate the distribution of ﬁve
different (outcome-based) motivations in terms of social preferences (selﬁshness, efﬁciency, maximin, inequality aversion
à la Fehr and Schmidt, and inequality aversion à la Bolton and Ockenfels) across different age groups as well as separately
for boys and girls. A notable distinction from the previous literature is that we use allocation tasks that involve three, rather
than two, persons. With two-person tasks, the allocator is either better or worse off than the other person (if the allocation
is unequal). With three-person tasks, it becomes possible that the allocator is better off than one other person in the group,
but worse off than another one. Such situations give rise to weighing advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, and
they also allow for estimating the importance of maximin-preferences separately. The importance of the latter justiﬁes our
approach ex post. Moreover, similar to the route taken in Almås et al. (2010) our paper contributes to the literature on
social preferences in childhood and adolescence by presenting an econometric mixture model that allows us to estimate
the inﬂuence of age and gender on the likelihood of revealing a particular motivation. We think that this makes the analysis
of social preference motivations more informative than a mere description of choice frequencies, and it avoids the – in our
view, unrealistic – assumption that a particular person is of a particular type with certainty and under all circumstances.
Most importantly, however, our paper differs from all previously discussed papers in that it estimates both primary and
secondary social preferences, thereby giving a more complete picture of how social preferences may motivate behavior, in
particular when the primary motivation implies indifference between different choices.
3. The experiment
3.1. Theoretical background
We deﬁne the ﬁve motives for decision making regarding social preferences as follows. Let yi and yj /= i be the material
payoffs of a player i and a set of other players j /= i (where the set can be a singleton, but can also include more than one
other player). A player i that maximizes yi regardless of yj /= i in an allocation decision is said to be selﬁsh (and subsumed
under the category Selﬁshness in the following).
Social welfare considerations can take on various forms with two “extreme” special cases: if a subject maximizes the sumof payoffs (
n∑
k=1
yk) she is classiﬁed as an Efﬁciency-oriented decision maker (following Utilitarian preferences), and if she
maximizes theminimumpayoff inher groupof subjects she is denotedMaximin-motivated (followingRawlsianpreferences).
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roth forms of social welfare considerations (Efﬁciency and Maximin) play an important role in the well-known behavioral
odel of Charness and Rabin (2002).
Inequality aversion may also have a bearing on social welfare in that it may be informative about the relative importance
etween the two extreme points mentioned above. It could also be related to selﬁsh concerns where one evaluates one’s
wn income in relation to others’ income. This will become apparent as we discuss primary as well as secondary social
references. Inequality aversion has been captured in two seminal models. While in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequality is
easured as the difference of one’s own payoff to each of the other players’ individual payoffs, and subjects have a disutility
oth from advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, in the ERC-model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) inequality is
easured with respect to a subject’s share of the total payoff in her group.
More precisely, the utility function of player i in the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is speciﬁed as
Ui (y) = yi − ˛i
1
n − 1
∑
j /= i
max
{
yj − yi,0
}
− ˇi
1
n − 1
∑
j /= i
max
{
yi − yj,0
}
(1)
here n is the number of players, and it is assumed that the inequality sensitivity parameters satisfy two assumptions: (i)
i ≤i, and (ii) 0≤ˇi <1. Preferences according to Eq. (1), given that ˇi, i >0, will be called the F&S motivation in our data
nalysis.
In the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) player i maximizes her motivation function, which is given by
vi = vi (yi, i) , (2)
here yi denotes the player i’s own payoff and i her share of the total payoff in her group. For any given yi the value of the
otivation function is maximized if i =1/n. Acting according to (2) will be classiﬁed as ERC motivated in the following.
.2. Experimental design
In their seminal paper, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) have designed simple distribution games to explicitly test and
iscriminate between the above-mentioned motivations of social preferences. We, therefore, rely on several aspects of their
xperimental design in our study.2
In our experiment, each subject had to choose one out of three allocations in eight different games3 that were originally
esigned by Engelmann and Strobel (2004)with the aim to discriminate between the different social preferencemotivations
f Selﬁshness, Efﬁciency, Maximin, and inequality aversion of the F&S- or ERC-variant. Each allocation assigns each of three
ersons (labeled persons 1–3) a speciﬁc amount of money (see Tables 1–3). Decisions were always made in the role of
erson 2 who had to choose an allocation that distributed money to persons 1, 2, and 3. Only at the end of the experiment
he roles of persons 1, 2, and 3 as well as payoff-relevant decisions were ﬁnally determined for each participant. Subjects
ere randomly assigned to groups of three people and the distribution chosen by person 2 was implemented.4 The eight
ames can be grouped into three different sets of games that are introduced in the following.
.2.1. Taxation games
In this set of games, the income of the decision maker (person 2) is the same in all three allocations and person 2 is
lways the “middle income” earner, while person 1 (person 3) is always the “high income” (“low income”) earner. The
ecision maker has to decide on a distribution between high and low income, which resembles a redistributive tax system.
e selected two out of the four taxation games used in Engelmann and Strobel (2004). The payoffs of the two games are
resented in Table 1 (games Fx and Ex in Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).5
Obviously, one cannot identify a selﬁsh motivation with taxation games, since the payoff for person 2 is the same in all
hree allocations. In both games, Maximin and F&S predict the same choice, while ERC predicts a different allocation choice
han F&S. The efﬁcient allocation (Efﬁciency) coincides in game Fx with F&S and Maximin and in game Ex with ERC. As a
onsequence, it is possible to distinguish the importance of the two inequality aversion models, ERC and F&S, without any
onfounding effects arising from efﬁciency concerns.
2 Note that Engelmann and Strobel’s (2004) results have initiated a discussion on the inﬂuence of different subject pools (such as economics versus
on-economics students, or subjects not pursuing a college/university education) on results regarding the distribution of social preference types. See the
omments by Fehr et al. (2006) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) on Engelmann and Strobel (2004) and the reply by Engelmann and Strobel (2006) for
etails. No reference was made in this discussion to the development of social preferences of children and adolescents.
3 Following the literature we call the experimental task of choosing one out of three allocations a “game”, although there is no strategic interaction.
trictly speaking, the task is an individual decision making task on the allocation of monetary payoffs. We also follow the terminology of Engelmann and
trobel (2004) when presenting the three subsets of games in Subsections 3.2.1–3.2.3.
4 Note that Engelmann and Strobel (2004) also used decisions under role uncertainty in their main experiment, but report that determining roles right
rom the beginning in a control experiment (meaning that only participants in the role of person 2 had to make decisions) does not yield different results
egarding the distribution of social preferences.
5 For explanations regarding the predictions summarized in Table 1, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004). We have included in Tables 1–3 already the
elative frequencies of actually chosen distributions. We shall refer to these results in Section 4.
Table 1
Taxation Games (payoffs in euro).
Game FX Game EX
Left Middle Right Left Middle Right
Person 1 payoff 6.8 7.2 7.6 8.4 6.8 5.2
Person 2 payoff 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.8 4.8 4.8
Person 3 payoff 3.6 2 0.4 1.2 1.6 2.0
Total payoff 14.4 13.2 12.0 14.4 13.2 12.0
Prediction
Selﬁsh Left Middle Right Left Middle Right
Efﬁciency Left Left
Maximin Left Right
F&S Left Right
ERC Right Left
Choices, percentages
Total sample (N=883) 65.8 19.9 14.3 34.2 10.8 55.0
Boys (N=269) 58.4 20.8 20.8 46.7 11.2 42.1
Girls (N=514) 71.2 19.3 9.6 25.2 10.6 64.2
8/9 years old (N=116) 53.5 18.1 28.5 40.4 17.5 42.1
10/11 years old (N=239) 54.8 25.5 19.7 35.4 10.1 54.4
12/13 years old (N=210) 68.6 21.4 10.0 28.2 9.1 62.7
14/15 years old (N=169) 69.8 19.5 10.7 38.7 7.7 53.6
16/17 years old (N=149) 84.6 10.7 4.7 30.9 12.8 56.4
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 86.7 6.7 6.7 40.0 16.7 43.3
Chi2-tests for differences*
Gender differences <0.001 0.001
Age differences 0.001 0.019
Age differences for boys 0.001 0.096
Age differences for girls 0.001 0.030
* p-values.
3.2.2. Envy games
In the three envy games presented in Table 2 (gamesN, Nx, and Ny in Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), the decision maker
(i.e., person 2) is again the “middle income” earner. These games aim at eliciting preferences concerning inequality. Envy
could make person 2 reduce the income of the high-income individual, although it would also reduce it for the low-income
person. In game N the payoff of person 2 is ﬁxed, and the F&S-choice is Pareto-dominated by the ERC-compliant allocation,
whereas the ERC-choice is also Pareto-dominated by the efﬁcient/maximin choices. Games Nx and Ny are necessary to
distinguish between selﬁshness and the non-selﬁsh motives.
3.2.3. Rich and poor games
Table 3 presents the third set of games.While the decisionmaker’s payoff is held constant in each game, the relation to the
other two players’ payoffs varies. In game R (P) the decision maker is the richest (poorest) group member in any allocation,
while in game Ey the decision maker is the “middle income” earner. In the “Rich and Poor” games, F&S and ERC predict
the same choice of allocation. Consequently, these games are used to distinguish between efﬁciency concerns, maximin
preferences, and inequality concerns.
3.3. Experimental procedure
The experiment was run in three elementary schools and four high schools in the Federal State of Tyrol, Austria. It was
part of a larger series of experiments in which we visited the involved schools repeatedly over a period of two years, asking
children to make decisions in different experimental tasks (for example, to study their risk and time preferences; see Sutter
et al., 2013). There is an overlap in the subject pools used in Martinsson et al. (2011) and Fehr et al. (2013) and our paper.
Out of the 883 subjects participating in the experiment of this paper, 705 had participated in Fehr et al. (2013) and 482 in
Martinsson et al. (2011). In Section 2 we have presented the main research questions and results of these papers, and how
we differ from them.
The whole project was approved by the State Board of Education of Tyrol and the principals of the selected schools.
All parents of involved children were sent a letter with general information on the project and its aim to study economic
decision making (including the information that children could earn money in the experiments), without revealing any
speciﬁc details or experimental tasks to be completed. Parents were of course free not to approve participation of their
children, but only ﬁve out of almost 900 did so. All other parents gave their consent.
Children and teenagers were also instructed clearly that participation was voluntary (and that they could earn money),
but no single child refused to participate in any of the experiments that we conducted. Since the experiment was run during
regular school hours, and given that all students in the selected classes participated, there is practically no self-selection
Table 2
Envy games (payoffs in euro).
Game N Game NX Game NY
Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right
Person 1 payoff 6.4 5.2 4.0 6.4 5.2 4.0 4.0 5.2 6.4
Person 2 payoff 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 3.6 3.2 2.8
Person 3 payoff 2.0 1.2 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.4 1.2 2.0
Total payoff 11.6 9.6 7.6 12.0 9.6 7.2 8.0 9.6 11.2
Prediction
Selﬁsh Left Middle Right Left Left
Efﬁciency Left Left Right
Maximin Left Left Right
F&S Right Left Right Left
ERC Middle Left Middle Left Middle
Choices, percentage
Total sample (N=883) 67.2 12.5 20.3 87.9 7.9 4.2 42.7 18.0 39.2
Boys (N=269) 69.4 11.7 19.0 88.1 7.6 4.3 43.8 14.3 41.9
Girls (N=514) 65.7 13.1 21.3 87.8 8.0 4.1 42.0 20.7 37.3
8/9 years old (N=116) 47.0 17.4 35.7 74.8 13.9 11.3 41.4 17.2 41.4
10/11 years old (N=239) 66.1 13.0 20.9 84.8 9.3 5.9 42.0 10.1 47.9
12/13 years old (N=210) 69.5 9.5 21.0 92.9 3.3 3.8 45.7 14.3 40.0
14/15 years old (N=169) 73.4 13.6 13.0 87.6 11.2 1.2 34.3 25.4 40.2
16/17 years old (N=149) 74.5 10.7 14.8 96.6 3.4 0.0 50.3 28.2 21.5
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 70.0 26.7 3.3 83.3 13.3 3.3 10.0 13.3 76.7
Chi2-tests for differences*
Gender differences 0.516 0.960 0.046
Age differences <0.001 0.001 0.001
Age differences for boys 0.001 0.039 0.015
Age differences for girls 0.123 0.001 0.001
* p-values.
Table 3
“Rich and Poor” games (payoffs in euro).
Game R Game R Game EY
Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right
Person 1 payoff 2.0 3.2 4.4 3.2 4.4 5.6 5.2 6.8 8.4
Person 2 payoff 4.8 4.8 4.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.6 3.6 3.6
Person 3 payoff 1.6 1.2 0.8 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2
Total payoff 8.4 9.2 10.0 7.6 8.4 9.2 10.8 12.0 13.2
Prediction
Selﬁsh Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right
Efﬁciency Right Right Right
Maximin Left Left Middle Right Left
F&S Right Left Left
ERC Right Left Left
Choices, percentage
Total sample (N=883) 46.3 27.5 26.3 37.4 21.7 40.9 47.6 15.3 37.1
Boys (N=269) 38.5 28.7 32.8 31.4 20.8 47.8 40.4 11.7 48.0
Girls (N=514) 51.9 26.6 21.5 41.7 22.4 35.9 52.8 18.0 29.2
8/9 years old (N=116) 49.1 24.1 26.7 35.3 21.6 43.1 44.8 16.4 38.8
10/11 years old (N=239) 45.4 19.3 35.3 39.8 19.3 41.0 51.1 19.0 30.0
12/13 years old (N=210) 50.7 21.5 27.8 41.0 24.8 34.3 50.5 15.2 34.3
14/15 years old (N=169) 38.5 44.4 17.2 30.8 21.3 47.9 39.1 13.0 47.9
16/17 years old (N=149) 48.0 32.4 19.6 37.6 22.2 40.3 50.0 11.5 38.5
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 53.3 20.0 26.7 33.3 6.7 60.0 36.7 23.3 40.0
Chi2-tests for differences*
Gender differences 0.001 0.001 0.001
Age differences <0.001 0.324 0.027
Age differences for boys 0.013 0.316 0.236
Age differences for girls 0.001 0.333 0.055
Table 4
Number of participants by age and gender.
All subjects Subjects with correct answers in control questions
Girls Boys Total Girls Boys Total % valid
8/9 years (3rd grade) 56 60 116 31 33 64 55.2%
10/11 years (5th grade) 144 95 239 101 65 166 69.5%
12/13 years (7th grade) 122 88 210 96 74 170 81.0%
14/15 years (9th grade) 105 64 169 91 55 146 86.4%
16/17 years (11th grade) 86 63 149 77 56 133 89.3%
Total 513 370 883 396 283 679 76.9%
into the experiment. The participants were between eight and 17 years old. They were attending third, ﬁfth, seventh, ninth,
or eleventh grade in school. Table 4 presents the number of participants, split up by age and gender.6
The experiment was conducted as a pen-and-paper experiment in all 38 classes in which we conducted the experiment.
Each single session was run jointly by the ﬁrst (male) and third (female) authors of this paper, thus keeping conditions
identical across sessions. The following procedure was used in all sessions: ﬁrst, the instructions were explained, following a
ﬁxed scriptwhich is included in Appendix A1 in the Online Supplement.7 Already in the course of explaining the experiment,
subjects were given plenty of opportunities to ask private questions. It is important to stress that our explanations were
visually supported by drawing “decision trees” on the blackboard in order to illustrate the choices to be taken and how role
selection (as persons 1, 2, or 3) would take place. Furthermore, we went through many examples.
After the general explanation of the experimental task we asked subjects to answer two control questions that concerned
the indication of payoffs contingent on particular choices and role assignments.8 The sheet with the control questions was
collected before we explained once more in public the correct solutions. Collecting these sheets allows us to check whether
those subjects who made mistakes in the control questions make different choices in the experiment than those answering
correctly. Overall, we had 679 out of 883 subjectswho answered both questions correctly (accounting for 77% of the sample).
The right-hand side of Table 4 shows the number of subjects with correct answers in each age group, indicating that the
relative frequency of correct answers is increasing sharply with age. Since we explained the correct solutions after collecting
the control questions, but before the experiment, and also answered any remaining questions on the control questions in
detail, we are conﬁdent that participants understood the experimental task very well. For the analysis, we therefore present
in the main text the results based on all 883 participants. In Appendix A3 in the Online Supplement, we provide a sensitivity
analysis of our main results that excludes all participants with at least one incorrect answer in the control questions; hence,
the results of this analysis are based on the 679 subjects with correct answers only. As it turns out, there are only minor
differences between the two pools. In particular, taking the restricted sample renders selﬁsh behavior less important (and
sometimes insigniﬁcant), while the signiﬁcance of all other social preferences remains practically unchanged.9
After the control questions had been worked through and no more questions remained unanswered, students were given
their decision sheets and asked to make their eight choices. They could go back and forth and change their answers if they
wished.
Students were informed at the beginning of the experiment that they would never be matched with someone from their
own class, but with someone from the same grade in any of the schools participating in the experiment. The matching was
determined after the experiment by randomly grouping persons 1, 2, and 3 from the same grade together, excluding class
mates as potential matches. At the end of the experiment, each student answered a short questionnaire on demographic
background data and then drew a card that determined her role (as person 1, 2, or 3) and then rolled an eight-sided dice to
determine which decision was payoff-relevant.10 Monetary earnings were distributed in sealed envelopes marked with a
student’s ID within two weeks after the experiment.11
6 Note that one of the high schools involved is attended by girls only. Therefore, we have more girls than boys in our sample. There is no indication,
however, that girls in the single-sex school exhibit a different behavior in our experiment than those in schools with co-education.
7 Note that the translation of the ﬁxed script does not account for the fact that, contingent on private questions that were taken by the experimenters,
some parts of the instructions were repeated if necessary.
8 The control questions were open questions. Consequently, nine possible answers could be given per control question (i.e. the nine different payoffs).
Thus, getting both control questions right per mere guessing was very unlikely.
9 Also when looking at the ranks of the ﬁve different motives, we notice a strong coincidence of the results in Table 5 and those presented in Appendix
A3. Out of the ten panels (with age x gender), ﬁve show the exact same ranking, and in the other ﬁve there are two (out of the ﬁve) motivations that swap
ranks, meaning that in total of the 50 ranks in Table 5 (5 per panel), 40 ranks are identical in Appendix A3, and the ten others are mutual swaps.
10 We prepared for each age group the number of cards needed for all subjects to have full triples of person 1, person 2 and person 3. Hence, in each age
group we had at most one triple that was incomplete. In the latter case, we used another person’s decision a second time to substitute for the missing
person in the triple, but everybody was of course paid based on exactly one decision of a person 2. Since it was independently determined for each subject
which game was payoff-relevant, it may have been the case that someone made a decision relevant for themselves, but not for anyone else in a particular
game (or vice versa). However, this fact should not matter for the decisions, since the payoff was determined by the assigned person 2 in the particular
game that was chosen by the die roll.
11 Since we were running several experiments with the children over the course of two years, children were sure (and had experienced it before) that we
would come back and pay them the correct earnings according to the rules in the experiment.
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ence, the real payoffs were smaller in our game than in Engelmann and Strobel (2004), where subjects were university
tudents.12 The amounts presented in Tables 1–3 are in euros and euro-cents, and they applied for students aged 14–17
grades nine and eleven). For the younger age groups (grades three, ﬁve, and seven) these amounts were divided by two to
ccount for their signiﬁcantly lower pocket money and purchasing power.13 It should be noted that the school curriculum
or third-graders in Austria includes a detailed treatment of money and how euros and euro-cents relate to each other and
ow money-amounts can be added or subtracted from each other. The lessons including this information had been prior
o our experiment in the third grade, meaning that third-graders (and certainly all students in higher grades) were familiar
ith how to read the payoffs on our decision sheets and understood the examples that we used.
Finally, we would like to mention that we presented the games in a way that is slightly different from Engelmann and
trobel (2004). They had shown for each possible allocation the average payoff per person and the total sum of payoffs. The
oncept of an average is unfamiliar to the youngest children in our sample, and hence we did not mention it. Furthermore,
e did not indicate the total sum of payoffs because we were afraid that this could provide a too strong focal point for the
tudents’ choices. As a consequence, we could keep the decision sheet as simple as possible.
. Results
.1. Overview of choices
The bottom panels of Tables 1–3 present an overview of the relative choice frequencies in the three different sets of
ames. We show overall averages (“Total sample”), average results for girls and boys separately, and also average results
or each age group. In order to facilitate comparison of our results to choices made by adults we also include the relative
hoice frequencies from Engelmann and Strobel (2004) in the last line of each table. It is immediately obvious that our oldest
articipants (16- to 17-year olds) make decisions that are in most games similar to those in Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
ne marked exception is the Game NX where we observe a much larger frequency of selﬁsh/inequality-motivated choices
nd a lower frequency of efﬁciency/maximin-motivated choices than Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
The general pattern in our data is that we ﬁnd signiﬁcant differences between the choices of girls and boys in all games
xcept “Game N” and “game Nx” of the “Envy games”. We also observe signiﬁcant age differences in the choice frequencies
n all games (least pronounced in “Game P” of the “Rich and Poor games”). In order to examine the inﬂuence of age and
ender in greater detail and in a more rigorous way, we proceed in the following with an econometric analysis of the data.
.2. Econometric analysis of social preferences
Weconduct amaximum likelihooderror-rate analysis of subjects’ decisions following the general lines of the econometric
odel used in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). The econometric model is a mixture model in which each subject’s primary
otivation is drawn from a common prior distribution over the ﬁve types of motivations Selﬁshness, Efﬁciency, Maximin,
&S, and ERC. A subject’s motivation is assumed to be the same in all eight games, but decision makers are allowed to make
rrors.
More formally, let i ∈
{
1, ..., N
}
index the subjects and let k ∈
{
1, ..., 5
}
denote the different motivations of social
references a subject can exhibit. Deﬁne c ∈
{
1, 2, 3
}
as thenumber of choices that are compatiblewith a givenmotivation
in a given game.14 We assume that a k-motivated subject normally makes a k-compatible decision, but in each game the
ubject makes an error with probability εk ∈ [0, 1]. If a subject makes an error, she chooses each of the three available
ctions with probability 1/3. For a given k-motivated subject, the probability of a k-compatible decision in a given game is
hen 1c − 3−c3c εk. Accordingly, the probability of any single non k-compatible decision is
εk
3 . We assume that the errors are
.i.d. across games and subjects.15
The likelihood function is constructed as follows: let Tk,c denote the total number of games in which there are c k-
ompatible decisions. Furthermore, xic
k
represents the number of subject i’s decisions that are compatible with k’s behavior
n games in which she has c k-motivated decisions, with xi
k
=
(
xi1
k
, xi2
k
, xi3
k
)
, xi =
(
xi1, . . ., x
i
5
)
, and x =
(
x1, . . .., xN
)
. Let pk
12 Given that the experiments by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) were incentivized using D-Mark, it implies that we multiplied real payoffs by 0.4 (0.8)
or our younger (older) participants.
13 According to the survey that we conducted with the same set of children, the average pocket money for 5th-graders is around D 5 per week, while it
s about D 14 for 9th-graders. Age groups were provided with age-speciﬁc decision sheets with their payoffs in D stated accordingly.
14 Recall that in some games the prediction for a speciﬁc motivation allows for more than one choice option.
15 Engelmann and Strobel (2004) use a logit model in their estimation while we use a uniform distribution of the error term. Note that in the design
f Engelmann and Strobel (2004) each subject faces only one decision, for which reason they cannot take into account any individual differences but
ave to focus on the “average subject” with all heterogeneity incorporated in the error. In our design each subject faces eight decisions, allowing us to
ake into account individual differences and to estimate the distribution of types directly (while the approach of Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, yields
arder-to-interpret odds ratios).
Fig. 1. Girls’ estimated distribution of primary social preferences (based on Table 5).
denote a subject’s commonprior probability of being k-motivated,with
5∑
k=1
pk = 1 andp = (p1, . . ., p5),while εk indicates the
error rate of a k-motivated subject and ε = (ε1, . . .., ε5). The probability of observing a particular samplewith xik k compatible
decisions when subject i is k-motivated can then be expressed as:
Lik
(
εk|x
i
k
)
=
∏
c=1,2,3
1
c
− 3 − c
3c
εk
xic
k εk
3
Tk,c−xick
, (3)
If one weighs the right-hand side by pk, takes the sum over k, applies logarithms, and then sums over i, one gets the
log-likelihood function for the entire sample:
ln L (p, ε|x) =
N∑
i=5
ln
5∑
k=1
pkL
i
k
(
εk|x
i
k
)
(4)
With ﬁve motivations the model has nine independent parameters: four independent motivation probabilities pk, and
ﬁve motivation error rates εk. We produce ten separate estimations for this set of parameters maximizing function (4),
separately for each age group and gender.16
4.2.1. Primary social preference motivations
The estimated parameters p = (p1, . . ., p5) represent the distribution of social preference motivations and are givenin Table 5 as well as presented graphically in Figs. 1 and 2.17 A general pattern emerging from Table 5 is that Efﬁciency
and Maximin explain the largest fraction of subjects’ primary motivations indicating that social welfare as compared to
selﬁsh motives plays a major role. However, there are interesting effects of age and gender when considering single social
16 We use an EM algorithm as proposed in the seminal paper of Dempster et al. (1977). Standard errors are estimated by bootstrapping.
17 All the results presented here are robust to an alternative error structure reported in Appendix A4. In this alternative model, for a given motivation the
non-compatible decisions have different probabilities to be chosen.
Table 5
Estimated distribution of primary social preferences by gender and age (full sample, standard errors in parenthesis).
Girls Boys
Motivation Motivation probability pk Error rate εk Motivation probability pk Error rate εk
Age group 8/9 Selﬁshness 0.122** 0.000*** 0.321*** 0.244***
(0.061) (0.125) (0.116) (0.169)
Efﬁciency 0.197*** 0.328*** 0.303*** 0.333***
(0.067) (0.087) (0.073) (0.070)
Maximin 0.501*** 0.630*** 0.054 0.090***
(0.104) (0.076) (0.046) (0.253)
F&S 0.180** 0.422*** 0.163** 0.385**
(0.077) (0.100) (0.077) (0.263)
ERC 0.000 1.000 0.159* 1.000
(0.025) (0.095) (0.093) (0.040)
LogLikelihood −434.99 −457.01
Age group 10/11 Selﬁshness 0.166*** 0.000*** 0.128*** 0.000***
(0.046) (0.076) (0.049) (0.113)
Efﬁciency 0.345*** 0.479*** 0.362*** 0.356***
(0.050) (0.037) (0.060) (0.054)
Maximin 0.297*** 0.227*** 0.275*** 0.365***
(0.050) (0.041) (.065) (0.079)
F&S 0.146*** 0.324*** 0.150*** 0.407***
(0.039) (0.042) (0.052) (0.079)
ERC 0.046 1.000 0.086* 0.791
(0.029) (0.068) (0.050) (0.231)
LogLikelihood −1023.00 −690.06
Age group 12/13 Selﬁshness 0.140*** 0.203*** 0.223*** 0.000***
(0.053) (0.111) (0.060) (0.026)
Efﬁciency 0.151*** 0.394*** 0.429*** 0.414***
(0.046) (0.066) (0.072) (0.050)
Maximin 0.546*** 0.325*** 0.292*** 0.412***
(0.060) (0.031) (0.079) (0.061)
F&S 0.163*** 0.336*** 0.055 0.213***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.034) (0.157)
ERC 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001)
LogLikelihood −830.69 −622.13
Age group 14/15 Selﬁshness 0.052 0.000*** 0.277*** 0.456***
(0.040) (0.216) (0.097) (0.191)
Efﬁciency 0.341*** 0.491*** 0.532*** 0.388***
(0.068) (0.056) (0.092) (0.060)
Maximin 0.558*** 0.470*** 0.192*** 0.284***
(0.079) (0.043) (0.074) (0.106)
F&S 0.048 0.343** 0.000 1.000
(0.038) (0.295) (0.017) (0.157)
ERC 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.021)
LogLikelihood −777.06 −456.47
Age group 16/17 Selﬁshness 0.106* 0.000*** 0.215*** 0.060***
(0.059) (0.084) (0.078) (0.076)
Efﬁciency 0.121*** 0.347*** 0.507*** 0.334***
(0.043) (0.065) (0.078) (0.030)
Maximin 0.694*** 0.437*** 0.278*** 0.301***
(0.078) (0.034) (0.070) (0.034)
F&S 0.079 0.356*** 0.000 0.276***
(0.053) (0.061) (0.022) (0.224)
ERC 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.930*
(0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.040)
LogLikelihood −606.22 −411.00
All age groups Selﬁshness 0.126*** 0.071*** 0.226*** 0.183***
(0.026) (0.078) (0.039) (0.081)
Efﬁciency 0.249*** 0.458*** 0.433*** 0.379***
(0.027) (0.03) (0.033) (0.025)
Maximin 0.483*** 0.387*** 0.223*** 0.341***
(0.035) (0.022) (0.034) (0.040)
F&S 0.126*** 0.348*** 0.082*** 0.355***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.046)
ERC 0.015 1.000 0.036 1.000
(0.015) (0.12) (0.024) (0.097)
LogLikelihood −3705.18 −2663.64
Note: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, for motivation probability the null hypothesis is pk =0, for error rate the null hypothesis is εk =1
(i.e. random behavior).
Fig. 2. Boys’ estimated distribution of primary social preferences (based on Table 5).
preferences. From Fig. 1 as well as Table 5 it becomes obvious that girls are primarily Maximin-motivated and that this
motivation increases with age. In total, roughly 50% of the girls have Maximin as their primary motivation. Among boys,
Fig. 2 and Table 5 show that Efﬁciency is instead the most common social preference motive (in slightly more than 40% of
boys, with an almost monotonic increase with age). Efﬁciency is also the second most common motivation among girls, but
without the clear age proﬁle as for boys. Among boys, more than 20% are primarily motivated by Selﬁshness and Maximin,
respectively, while a much smaller share of girls display selﬁsh preferences (12%). F&S-preferences are about as common
among girls as Selﬁshness, and even less among boys. Moreover, these preferences become less prominent with age. More
precisely, the estimated probability of F&S-preferences becomes even insigniﬁcant in the two oldest age groups (14/15
years and 16/17 years). ERC-preferences are not signiﬁcant in any age group (borderline for boys of age eight to eleven),
corroborating the conclusion of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) that ERC is not as suitable in explaining behavior as F&S.
To evaluate how well our model can explain the data, we counted how many observations correspond precisely to the
behavior of the primary motivation subjects are assigned to. Using the estimated parameters, by Eq. (3) we calculated for
each subject the probability to obtain the observed data, assuming that the individual has a given k-motivation, i.e. p (xi|ki),
where – with a slight abuse of notation – xi denotes the choices and ki ∈ {1, . . . , 5} denotes the primary motivation of
individual i. Finally, using Bayes rule we can compute the probability that an individual i is k-motivated, given the observed
choices, i.e., p (ki|xi). For example, the probability that individual i is motivated by Selﬁshness (ki =1), given the observed
choices xi, is:
p (ki = 1|xi) =
p (xi|ki = 1) pˆ1
p (xi|ki = 1) pˆ1 + p (xi|ki = 2) pˆ2 + p (xi|ki = 3) pˆ3 + p (xi|ki = 4) pˆ4 + p (xi|ki = 5) pˆ5
.
Then we assign each individual to the primary motivation that gives us the highest posterior probability and use the
assigned motivation for each individual to check if the observed behavior of the individual coincides with the predicted
behavior. This way, we calculate the proportion of observations where subjects behave exactly in accordance with the
primary motivation they were assigned to (Table 6). Across all age groups and both genders, this fraction ranges from 72.1%
to 83.7%, thus indicating a large share of correctly predicted choices.18
18 The predictions of the model are equally good for all groups, meaning that its ﬁt does not depend on age and gender.
Table 6
Fraction of actual choices predicted correctly by the most likely primary motivation of each subject (in%).
Girls Boys
Age group 8/9 74.6 82.5
Age group 10/11 81.8 79.5
Age group 12/13 82.1 82.4
Age group 14/15 72.1 80.5
Age group 16/17 76.7 83.7
Table 7
Distribution of the second most likely motivation, conditional on the most likely primary motivation, by gender.
Second most probable motivation
Selﬁshness Efﬁciency Maximin F&S ERC
Girls Most probable motivation Selﬁshness – 30.9 34.6 30.9 3.6
(primary motivation) Efﬁciency 11.5 – 67.7 0.0 20.8
Maximin 21.8 43.2 – 34.7 0.4
F&S 27.8 1.9 63.0 – 7.4
ERC 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 –
Boys Most probable motivation Selﬁshness – 37.0 25.9 12.3 24.7
(primary motivation) Efﬁciency 49.7 – 37.9 1.3 11.1
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eMaximin 41.7 38.5 – 13.5 6.3
F&S 53.6 0.0 28.6 – 17.9
ERC 16.7 50.0 16.7 16.7 –
.2.2. Secondary social preference motivations
Our approach also allows checking the posterior distribution of a subject’s most probable secondary motivation,19 con-
itional on his or her primary motivation. This is important to look at because if a subject’s primary motivation implies
ndifference between various choices (e.g., a selﬁsh person is indifferent between choices in the taxation and rich-and-poor
ames), then the secondary motivation will become crucial for making the choice.
Table 7 presents the posterior distribution of the secondary motivations, conditional on primary motivations. In the rows
e present, conditional on each of the primary motivations (whose posterior relative frequency is shown in Table A1 in the
nline Supplement), the relative frequency with which any of the four remaining motivations is the most likely secondary
otivation. We observe differences between girls and boys also here.
A majority of the girls have Maximin as their primary motivation, and among these, the secondary motivation is most
ikely Efﬁciency, followed by F&S. Among the 24% girls who are primarily Efﬁciency-motivated more than two thirds display
aximin as their secondary motivation, further corroborating that this motive plays a great role for girls’ decision making.
Among the boys, the most common primary motivation is Efﬁciency, and the secondary motivations conditional on
aving Efﬁciency as the primary are about equally divided over Selﬁshness and Maximin. The boys whose primary motivation
s instead Selﬁshness (Maximin) hold secondary motivations that are to the largest extent Efﬁciency, followed by Maximin
Efﬁciency and Selﬁshness are of roughly equal importance). Hence, Table 7 corroborates our ﬁnding that girls and boys differ
learly in their social preferences, also when taking secondary motivations into account.
.2.3. Robustness check for primary social preference motivations
As a ﬁnal robustness check of our results we assess the impact of age and gender on a subject’s probability of hav-
ng a speciﬁc primary motivation in another way: we assume that parameters pk have the following multinomial logit
peciﬁcation:
pk =
e˛k,0+˛k,1 · gender+˛k,2 · age+˛k,3 · gen age
1 + 4h=1e˛h,0+˛h,1 · gender+˛h,2 · age+˛h,3 · gen age
for k ∈
{
1,2,3,4
}
(6)
p5 =
1
1 + 4h=1e˛h,0+˛h,1 · gender+˛h,2 · age+˛h,3 · gen age
(7)
here “gen age” is the interaction variable between gender and age.20 Speciﬁcations (6) and (7) are plugged into (4). Then
e produce a one-step estimation, maximizing function (4), over the whole dataset.
By this speciﬁcation the model has 21 parameters that we can use to estimate the marginal effect of age and gender on
he prior probabilities of being k-motivated. Table 8 presents the results of this analysis.
19 We assign each individual to the motivation that gives us the second highest posterior probability computed using the procedure described above.
20 In this estimation, we use the exact age (in years and months) of the subjects at the time of the experimental sessions. This allows for a ﬁner-grained
stimation of the age affect.
Table 8
Marginal effect on the prior k-motivation probabilities.
Effect of/on Selﬁshness Efﬁciency Maximin F&S ERC
Age for Male −0.010 0.026** 0.013 −0.022*** −0.007
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007)
for Female −0.010 −0.014 0.043*** −0.014 −0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007)
Gender (female effect) for age group 8/9 −0.019 −0.019 0.150** −0.018 −0.093
(0.072) (0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.109)
for age group 10/11 −0.056 −0.143*** 0.179*** 0.030 −0.010
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.040) (0.040)
for age group 12/13 −0.062 −0.238*** 0.235*** 0.064** 0.002
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.032) (0.016)
for age group 14/15 −0.058 −0.309*** 0.297*** 0.069** 0.001
(0.052) (0.050) (0.055) (0.033) (0.005)
for age group 16/17 −0.052 −0.370*** 0.362*** 0.060* 0.000
(0.067) (0.070) (0.078) (0.033) (0.001)Notes: ***, **, * denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, standard errors in parentheses.
Marginal effects of age are computed evaluating the derivatives w.r.t age of equations (6) and (7), evaluated at the average age of male and female. Marginal
effects of gender are computed taking the differences of equations (6) and (7) between female and male, evaluated at the average age of each age group.
Not many subjects hold Selﬁshness as their primary motivation. Although there are some differences (see Table A1)
they are not statistically signiﬁcant with respect to age and gender. The probability of holding Efﬁciency as the primary
motivation is increasing with age for boys, but constant for girls. More precisely, the probability of having Efﬁciency as the
primary motivation is the same for boys and girls in the youngest age group of eight- to nine-year olds, but it is signiﬁcantly
higher for boys in all other age groups. Maximin-preferences become more prominent with increasing age for girls, but their
prominence remains constant across all age groups for boys, and it is signiﬁcantly lower for boys than for girls in all age
groups.
The likelihood of exhibiting F&S-preferences is decreasing with age for boys while it is constant for girls. There are no
signiﬁcant gender differences with respect to F&S-preferences in the two youngest age groups, up to the age of eleven years.
In the three oldest age groups, girls exhibit signiﬁcantly higher values, i.e., they care more about inequality than boys.
The overall picture emerging from Table 8 can be summarized as follows: efﬁciency-concerns becomemuchmore impor-
tant, while inequality aversion becomes less important for boys as they grow older. The desire to maximize the payoff of the
worst-off group member becomes more important when girls get older.
5. Discussion and conclusion
We have studied the inﬂuence of age and gender on the distribution of individual social preferences. In our experiment,
subjects had to make eight different, fully incentivized allocation choices that were originally designed by Engelmann
and Strobel (2004) to distinguish between ﬁve different social preference motivations: selﬁshness, efﬁciency concerns (by
maximizing the sumofpayoffs),maximinpreferences (bymaximizing thepayoff of theworst off), and two formsof inequality
aversion (based on the models by Fehr and Schmidt 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). We have run our experiments
with almost 900 eight- to 17-year old children and adolescents. The experiments were conducted in school (from third to
eleventh grade), with practically no drop-outs, thus avoiding potential problems that might arise from self-selection into
experiments. A comparison of the behavior of our oldest subjects with the choices of the subjects in Engelmann and Strobel
(2004) reveals that the decisions of both subject pools (i.e., our oldest high school students and the university students in
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) are largely in line with each other, except for one instance where their subjects lay an even
stronger focus on efﬁciency/maximin-concerns.
Our experimental results show that inequality aversion turns out to be a signiﬁcantmotivation in our younger age groups
of eight- to twelve-year olds. For the older age groups, however, we note that inequality aversion is no longer a signiﬁcant
motivation. Our ﬁndings on inequality aversion are in line with Fehr et al. (2013) and Martinsson et al. (2011), and they
complement in an interesting way the results of Fehr et al. (2008). The latter have found that inequality aversion develops
and becomes the most prominent motivation for allocation choices when children are seven to eight years old, compared
to younger children of age three to six. Our ﬁndings show that inequality aversion as a motivating force may, indeed, reach
a peak before the age of ten years and then decline in importance, especially for boys, making room for other concerns,
especially efﬁciency-orientation. Note that a majority of children was found to be inequality averse in Fehr et al. (2008),
while only about 20%of our youngest participantswere classiﬁed as inequality averse. Onepotential source for this difference
stems from the fact that Fehr et al. (2008) did not use money as a reward, while we did. Unpublished work by Fehr et al.
(2017) suggests that using money – instead of goods such as fruits or stickers − in experiments with children reduces the
fraction of inequality averse children.
We ﬁnd that efﬁciency concerns are signiﬁcantly increasing with age in our male sample (with the primary motivation
ranging from about 30% at the age of eight to roughly 50% at the age of 17). For girls, the evidence is a bit more mixed, as the
e
a
t
a
h
m
f
v
i
p
b
c
p
g
p
a
t
s
t
t
m
m
y
e
e
F
r
e
w
i
t
A
j
R
A
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
E
Estimated shares go up and down over the different age groups, but in almost all age groups (except the youngest ones) girls
re signiﬁcantly less efﬁciency-oriented than boys. The relative increase of efﬁciency concerns for boys is consistent with
he ﬁndings reported in Almås et al. (2010), who have also found that boys care more about efﬁciency than girls. Moreover,
signiﬁcant increase of efﬁciency concerns in the age group of nine- to 17-year olds and a stronger male focus on efﬁciency
as also been documented in the paper by Fehr et al. (2013). In the study of Almås et al. (2010), girls also care relatively
ore about equality. Note that the two-person design of Almås et al. (2010) does not allow disentangling equality motives
rom maximin-preferences properly. Hence, their ﬁnding and ours, that girls are primarily maximin-motivated and thereby
ery equity concerned, could be fully consistent with each other, although we do not ﬁnd very strong support for the two
nequality measures when contrasted with the maximin motivation.
A novel feature of our experiment, compared to previous papers, was the estimation of both primary and secondary social
reference motivations. As we have argued above, the most likely social preference motivation may imply indifference
etween various choices in some situations, which means that then the second most important motivation will become
rucial for making the choice. Moreover, estimating both the primary and the secondary motivation gives a more nuanced
icture of the complex interplay of social preferences.
Our main ﬁndings regarding secondary motivations are re-assuring for our results on primary motivations. Among the
irlswhose primarymotivation ismaximin, the secondarymotivation is likely either efﬁciency or F&S. This indicates a strong
reference for social welfare as compared to selﬁsh motives, which scores low on both primary and secondary motivations
mong girls. The girls whose primary motivation is instead efﬁciency hold secondary motivations that are to more than two
hirds maximin-motivated.
Among the boys whose primary motivation is efﬁciency, the secondary motivations are about equally divided between
elﬁshness and maximin. The boys whose primary motivation is instead selﬁshness (maximin) hold secondary motivations
hat are to the largest extent efﬁciency-motivated followedbymaximin (efﬁciencyandselﬁshness are roughly equally impor-
ant). Hence, although a non-negligible fraction of the boys displays maximin preferences as either primary or secondary
otivation, the general picture is that girls are strongly equality-concerned, with maximin preferences as the strongest
otive, while boys are more self- and efﬁciency-oriented and less concerned with equity.
Summing up, our experiment indicates that there are signiﬁcant developments in revealed social preferences from eight-
ear old children to 17-year old adolescents and that there are also relevant gender differences.21 The insights from our
xperiment can be considered of broader interest for several reasons: it seems plausible that social preferences shape many
conomically relevant decisions of teenagers, for instance in the domains of education, employment or charitable giving.
urthermore, economists might care about the development of social preferences in childhood and adolescence because the
esults of economic experiments might prove helpful in designing (economics and ethics) curricula in schools. For instance,
xperimental results could provide guidance on how to make children aware of different sharing norms and how to deal
ith conﬂicting norms. Future experiments could look at further motives or elaborate in even greater depth on the ones
nvestigated here. It would also be interesting to see our results conﬁrmed in an experiment that uses another set of decision
asks.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at https://doi.org/10.1016/
.jebo.2017.12.007.
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